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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND 
- • - - • ' - ' 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the District 
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding. On cross motions for summary judgment, Judge 
Wilkinson ruled that certain real property in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, to which appellants (Conrad G. Maxfield and Utah National 
Corporation) hold record title, is owned by respondents Ainsworth 
-1-
based upon the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Jurisdic-
tion is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-
2(3) (i) Utah Code Ann., and by virtue of the restrictions to the 
Court of Appeals under §78-2a-3, and pursuant to 3(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
• 1111 • II • ! • • • • . M H I H • I III • • ! • ! • • • • • • • . 1 ! II I N II III • • • • • • I l l • « " • m I III • I II • 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Whether the undisputed material facts as shown by those 
statements in the affidavits which would be admissible in 
evidence if offered at trial, and other matters in the record 
properly considered, establish that the respondents Ainsworth are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, and if so, the precise location of 
those boundaries. 
2. Whether the undisputed material facts as shown by those 
statements in the affidavits which would be admissible in 
evidence if offered at trial, and other matters in the record 
properly considered, establish that the appellants Maxfield and 
Utah National Corporation are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law based on record title and the absence of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
3. Whether there is any genuine issue as to a material fact 
respecting the existence or non existence of boundary by acquies-
cence, e.g. issues relating to the location of such alleged 
b^ndaries, issues respecting whether or not there was a dispute 
or uncertainty as to the true boundary line measured against an 
objective test, etc. 
NOTE: The issues cannot be defined more precisely than 
above at this time inasmuch as there are no findings of fact and 
the summary judgment entered by the District Court is not 
specific as to reasons or facts relied upon for the summary 
judgment. Although various arguments and facts were suggested in 
the summary judgment proceedings, it is unknown which, if any, 
were relied on by the lower court. Without such information, to 
speculate or to list every potential item mentioned in the record 
as a possibility would unduly burden this brief. Perhaps when 
respondents' brief is filed it will suggest specific reasons and 
facts they believe support the summary judgment, thereby more 
precisely delineating the issues. 
Notwithstanding the general nature of the above issues and 
the lack of information referred to, appellants believe that the 
specific common denominator running through all possible issues, 
including those above and any others which may be raised by 
respondents, is the question of whether the respondents have met 
the element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence which 
requires the existence of a dispute or uncertainty as to the true 
boundary line measured against an objective test. If this 
prerequisite element has not been met, as appellants urge, under 
the precedents cited hereafter the summary judgment should be 
reversed and the appellants restored to their record title as a 
matter of law. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE; RULE 56(c) and (e) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The portions of the rule relevant to this appeal are as 
follows: 
(c) "....[T]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
(e) "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE n n i •>•• • •• • • — • f c » — u — — — — — 
This case involves four large parcels of land (several acres 
each) in Salt Lake County which are adjacent to each other in a 
north to south 1,2,3,4 fashion, located west of 300 West Street 
and east of the Rio Grande railroad tracks between about 9400 
South Street and 10000 South Street. From north to south, the 
first parcel is owned by appellants (herein referred to as 
Maxfield or parcel 1), the second parcel is owned by respondents 
Ainsworth (herein referred to as Ainsworth or parcel 2), the 
third parcel is owned by respondent Staker (herein referred to as 
Staker or parcel 3), and the fourth parcel is owned by the 
Jensens and the Holmes (herein referred to as Jensen/Holmes or 
parcel 4). Within the third parcel is a small parcel owned by 
respondents Yocom (herein referred to as Yocom), and within the 
fourth parcel is a small parcel owned by respondents Shane 
(herein referred to as Shane). The following diagram is not 
drawn to scale, but is for illustration purposes only: 
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Solid line indicates survey line 
Dotted line indicates fence 
In 1985, S taker ( p a r c e l 3) sued Ainsworth and Jensen/Holmes , 
the ne ighbor ing landowners t o the nor th and to the s o u t h , 
( p a r c e l s 2 and 4, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) in Case No. C-85-2883 (R. 2 - 7 ) . 
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The suit was brought because Staker had discovered that the fence 
lines separating his parcel from both parcel 2 (Ainsworth) and 
parcel 4 (Jensen/Holmes) did not correspond with survey lines, 
and it was therefore necessary to determine the true boundaries 
(R. 5). Subsequently, Ainsworth (parcel 2) sued Maxfield (parcel 
1) for the same reason, that is, the fence lines between parcel 1 
and parcel 2 were also inconsistent with the survey lines (C85-
5024, R. 2-4).1 The second lawsuit was Case No. C85-5024, and 
during the course of the litigation, the two cases were consoli-
dated (C85-5024, R. 17-18). The record doesn't say why, but it 
was apparently because of the similarity in the situations of the 
four parcels, i.e., all had discrepancies between the fence lines 
and the survey lines. 
Respondents Shane and Yocom were brought into the litigation 
because of the effect a ruling in favor of the record title or 
the fence lines may have upon them (R. 2-7). The fence lines are 
north (and west in the case of the Yocom/Staker north/south 
boundary) of the survey lines on all of the parcels, although not 
the same distance on each one. 
The lower court, upon cross motions for summary judgment by 
the parties, granted summary judgment in favor of the fence lines 
and against the record titles on all properties, that is, the 
1
 All references to the record prefaced by C85-5024 refer to 
the separately numbered file for the action consolidated with the 
Staker action on March 3, 1986. 
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court ruled that boundary by acquiescence is established as a 
matter of law (R. 200-202). It is to be noted that although the 
consolidated caes involved all four large parcels plus the two 
small parcels in parcels 3 and 4, Maxfield (parcel 1) is the only 
party who has appealed, and therefore the boundary between parcel 
1 and parcel 2 is the only boundary being appealed herein (it 
being readily apparent that Maxfield is the only party to lose 
ground to which he has record title which is not substantially 
offset by gains under the lower court's boundary by acquiescence 
ruling, i.e. since the fences are north of the survey lines, the 
north property (parcel 1) loses ground, the two middle properties 
(parcels 2 and 3) come out about even, and the south property 
(parcel 4) gains by the court's adoption of the fence lines over 
record title). 
Numerous affidavits were filed in connection with the 
summary judgment motions. Many of the statements in the affi-
davits are controverted by statements in other affidavits and 
much of the material in the affidavits does not comply with Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respecting admissibility in 
evidence and other requirements. Inasmuch as the lower court did 
not recite any facts in its summary judgment ruling (R.199, 200-
202), it is unknown which of the controverted facts or other 
facts alleged in the affidavits were accepted by the court and on 
what basis the decision was made to hold as a matter of law that 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applied to defeat the 
record title. 
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Neverthelessr the pertinent facts that are not in dispute 
are as follows: 
1. That Maxfield (parcel 1) is the record owner of the 
parcel of land in dispute which is the subject of this appeal, 
which parcel is approximately 83 feet of frontage on 300 West 
Street and 960 feet deep, containing about one and three quarters 
acres of land. 
2. That generally speaking, the said disputed property has 
historically been enclosed within the fences of the Ainsworth 
parcel (parcel 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants believe that the lower court's summary decision 
that the fence lines are superior to the record title constitutes 
misapplication of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and 
iscontrary to the clear rules of established precedent. It is 
the position of the appellants herein (Maxfield, parcel 1) that 
proper application of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
requires a reversal of the judgment below and a ruling of summary 
judgment in favor of the record title (Maxfield, parcel 1). 
z
 The term "generally" is used because the location of the 
fence has been changed from time to time over many years to 
accommodate the erosion and changing courses of an adjacent 
watercourse (R. 182-185). 
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Essentially, Maxfield's argument for reversal and judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law is that the 1984 Utah Supreme 
Court cases of Halliday v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), and Parsons v. 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984), require that before the 
Ainsworths (parcel 2) can wrest away the record title from 
Maxfield (parcel 1) on the basis of boundary by acquiescence, 
they must establish all the prerequisite elements set out in 
those cases. The affidavits relied on by Ainsworth to establish 
the elements of boundary by acquiescence fall short of that 
requirement, and this is so, even if they are believed in total 
and the controverting affidavits ignored. The primary reason is 
that there is nothing in the record to establish the necessary 
element known as the "objective uncertainty" requirement, to-wit: 
...[T]hat during the period of acquiescence there was some 
circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably 
available survey information (or other technique by which 
record title information was located on the ground) that 
would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, 
from being reasonably certain about the true location of 
the boundary. Halliday v. Cluff, supra, at 505 and 
Stratford v. Morgan, supra, at 364. 
The affidavits filed in support of the summary judgment 
contain only immaterial, speculative and conjectural phrases such 
as, "may have," "it appears that," "it is my understanding that," 
(R. 194-195) "which I have been told," (R. 114) or otherwise 
allegations that are without foundation or involve other inad-
missible matters. A complete reading of all of the affidavits 
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and other materials in the record produces the inescapable 
conclusion that adequate correct survey information has always 
been reasonably available, that no one really knows why the 
fences weren't put on the proper lines, and that any suggestions 
to the contrary are mere conjecture and speculation. There is no 
showing that the fence lines in the wrong place arose out of a 
dispute or uncertainty measured by an objective standard as 
required by the cases mentioned above, and this is true even if 
all of the admissible facts are as represented by the Ainsworths 
in the affidavits on file. Therefore, the claim of boundary by 
acquiescence fails as a matter of law, the record title of 
Maxfield (parcel 1) should be reinstated, and the judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed. 
Appellants' alternative argument is that in any event the 
material alleged in respondents' affidavits has been sufficiently 
controverted in the affidavits submitted by Maxfield as to show 
genuine issues of material facts within the meaning of Rule 56 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure respecting respondents' claims, and 
therefore it was error for the lower court to grant the summary 
judgment depriving Maxfield of a trial of the issues. By way of 
clarification, it is appellants' position that there are no such 
issues that would stand in the way of a summary judgment for 
appellants1 record title, but there are several to prevent the 
summary judgment of the lower court stripping appellants of their 
record title. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING IS A MISAPPLICATION OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO 
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT. CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE 
DOCTRINE AND PRECEDENTS REQUIRES THE SUSTAINING OF THE 
RECORD TITLE AND REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
In 1984 the Utah Supreme Court decided three cases where 
parties attempted to establish title to land on the basis of 
boundary by acquiescence. These are cited on page 9, above. The 
Court's opinion in the first of these, Hallidvay v. Cluff, supra, 
pointed to some historical confusion and uncertainty in the law 
regarding the legal doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and 
boundary by agreement, and it clarified the law in that regard. 
It also discussed important policy considerations and emphasized 
that the law clearly gives precedence to record title over fence 
lines. 
The issues in the Halliday case are stated by the Court on 
page 501 of the opinion as: 
1. "...whether a showing of uncertainty or dispute on the 
location of a boundary line is necessary to the application of 
boundary by acquiescence, ... " 
2. "...if so, what is meant by 'uncertainty'", and 
3. "...who has the burden of proving it." 
The Court answered "yes" to the first question. To the 
second question, it made it very clear that the uncertainty 
required cannot be subjective, but should be measured against an 
-11-
objective test (685 P.2d at 505). In answer to the third 
question, the burden of proof was placed squarely upon the party 
seeking to displace another's record title (685 P.2d at 507). 
The following are the words of the court in answer to these three 
questions: 
1. At page 504, 
...we have concluded from the more recent cases 
and from the clear weight of authority that the 
relevance of this ingredient [a showing of 
uncertainty or dispute] is settled in our law. 
2. At page 505, 
...[we] hold that 'dispute1 is not proved by 
mere difference of opinion, and 'uncertainty' is 
not proved by a mere lack of knowledge of the 
true location of the boundary.... Finally, the 
ingredient that has been called 'dispute or 
uncertainty' should be measured against an 
objective test of reasonableness and should 
therefore more appropriately be called 
'objective uncertainty'. 
See also material quoted from the opinion on page 9, above. 
3. At page 507, 
...we hold that the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence has the burden of proving objective 
uncertainty as part of the prima facie elements 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above constitutes the 
applicable law in this appeal, that the Halliday case is on "all 
fours" with the present case, and that respondents have wholly 
failed in their burden to establish any "objective uncertainty" 
as it is defined in the above referenced decisions. 
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It is obvious from all of the affidavits and other portions 
of the record below that a long time ago fences in the area were 
not placed on the true boundary lines, but were placed at signif-
icant and varying distances away from them. The question is why? 
A possible answer to the question is suggested in Maxfield's 
(parcel 1) answer to Ainsworth's (parcel 2) complaint: That the 
fence separating parcels 1 and 2 was placed not as boundary, but 
as protection against livestock falling into a dangerous water-
course (C85-5024, R. 7). The evidence in support of this pro-
posed explanation is the lay of the land, that is, the steepness 
of the embankment, the obvious danger to animals, etc., suggests 
that the fence must have been erected to prevent livestock from 
hurting themselves. Nevertheless, this may not have been the 
reason the fence was erected in that location, that is, there is 
no direct evidence or an eyewitness, and the original fences were 
constructed so long ago (possibly as far back as the 1890's 
according to some of the affidavits) (R. 117, 119) that no one 
today knows how the locations for them were determined. 
The livestock protection explanation is mentioned in this 
brief not to conclusively establish it as the correct answer, but 
to show that such explanation is at least as plausable as any 
other proposed explanation, and it serves to emphasize that one's 
guess is as good as another's, or in other words, no one really 
knows. The bottom line is simply this: There isn't anything in 
the record that establishes why the fences were erected where 
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they were, and therefore, a fortiori, there is nothing in the 
record establishing any objective uncertainty concerning such. 
In Stratford v. Morgan, supra, at 363-364, the following words of 
the court are equally applicable to the facts in this appeal: 
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up 
and neither party does anything about it for a 
long period of time will not establish it as the 
true boundary. 
Not only is there nothing in the affidavits, or other 
appropriate portions of the record, to establish that there has 
ever at any time been any dispute or objective uncertainty, but 
statements of respondents' counsel in the oral arguments at the 
summary judgment hearing are tantamount to an admission on 
respondents' part that no such information is in the record nor 
could be. 
Four times the District Judge asked respondents' counsel to 
say when the dispute first arose (presumably to establish a 
beginning point for the dispute or uncertainty in order to deter-
mine if the requisite number of years had elapsed), and four 
times counsel was unable to give an answer that would show any 
dispute or objective uncertainty during the claimed period of 
acquiescence (R. 250, 253, 262, 263, 292). It is understandable 
that counsel would not be able to pinpoint the time of a dispute 
or uncertainty measured by an objective standard at any time 
during the alleged period of acquiescence inasmuch as, as has 
been pointed out above, none ever existed. In attempting to 
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suggest something (possible early erroneous surveys) that could 
constitute an objective uncertainty, counsel appears to be 
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("The thing speaks 
for itself") (R. 245, lines 7-14). That is, counsel appears to 
be arguing that a dispute or uncertainty and the existence of 
erroneous surveys are obvious or otherwise they wouldn't have put 
the fences in the wrong place, built the houses, etc. But no 
surveys have been produced. Even if there had been early surveys 
(as opposed to conjecture on respondents' part) there is no show-
ing that they would have been based on any objective uncertainty. 
As stated above, respondents admitted at the summary judg-
ment hearing in the lower court that they have no information: 
"... they (the fences) apparently were set to a survey 
that was erroneous, and even if that wasn't the case, 
..." (emphasis added) (R. 254). 
"We don't have anything before us to tell us on what 
basis that home was set." (R. 254). 
"...but how they get a survey to determine that is on 
their property we are not able to know at this point." 
(emphasis added! (iT. 259). 
"I have to assume" a survey was completed (R. 293). 
These statements on behalf of respondents admit the obvious, 
which is that nobody knows why the fences were set where they 
were set. Again, as stated in the Halliday case, uncertainty is 
not proved by a mere lack of knowledge of the true location of 
the boundary. 
In direct contrast to the speculation and "the thing speaks 
for itself" type of arguments adopted by those seeking to estab-
lish boundary by acquiescence without showing any objectively 
measureable uncertainty, appellants (Maxfield) have followed 
exactly the requisites laid down in Halliday; 
...[T]he record landowner may, of course, 
conclusively negate the existence of objective 
uncertainty by proving that the claimant or his 
predecessors in title had reasons to know the 
location of the true boundary before the 
expiration of the period of acquiescence. 
Halliday v. Cluff, supra, at 507. 
The affidavit of Robert B. Jones stands uncontroverted. It 
states that the monuments presently in place, from which a survey 
would be taken to survey the subject properties, have been in 
place in the same location and reasonably available for any 
surveyor since 1856 (R. 176). In other words, referring to the 
quoted material from the Halliday opinion on page 9 of this 
brief, there is nothing that would have prevented a landowner as 
a practical matter from being reasonably certain about the true 
location of the boundary. Therefore, the record shows in this 
appeal, that the record owners (Maxfield, parcel 1) have, as 
quoted above, conclusively negated the existence of objective 
uncertainty. 
Certainly it is possible that, as respondents suggest, there 
could have been an erroneous survey, or even more than one, back 
in the 1890's when the house and the fences were first establish-
ed, in 1920 as claimed (see discussion below), or any other time. 
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But there is no proof of any such surveysf and at best the 
affidavits of respondents' surveyor witnesses as to the existence 
of a survey are without foundation and are based on inadmissible 
evidence (R. 163-165, 167-170). But even if there were any 
applicable erroneous surveys, because the monuments have been in 
place since 1856, such survey(s) could not have been based on any 
objective uncertainty, whether there were mistakes in them or 
not. 
As eluded to in the Statement of Issues above, perhaps 
respondents' brief will specify in what ways they feel they have 
met the objective uncertainty test. Until that happens, however, 
it may be well to mention some of the major points respondents 
relied upon in their arguments before the lower court: 
The Rojck survey. Respondents claim one Mr. Rock may have 
surveyed many properites in the general area in 1920 and that 
these surveys were erroneous (R. 163-165). Appellants understand 
respondents' argument to be that this is an objectively 
measureable circumstance within the meaning of the Halliday 
decision based on footnote 7 on page 507, which states among 
other things: "To cite only one example a boundary located on a 
surveyed line could qualify for boundary by acquiescence, even 
though a subsequent survey showed the original survey to have 
been in error." (685 P.2d 507, footnote 7). There are at least 
three good reasons why that argument cannot be upheld: 
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1. There is no proof this survey ever occurred. No one has 
produced it, and it is only conjecture that such was ever done on 
any of the four parcels mentioned above (R. 169). Neither of the 
two surveyors who filed affidavits on behalf of respondents have 
shown in their affidavits that their comments about this alleged 
survey are based on their own personal knowledge as required by 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They have used terms 
such as "may have" and "Rock and/or other surveyors" (R. 193-
195), clearly indicating that they don't know whether this 
occurred or not. In fact, subsequent to filing his affidavit, 
one of them was asked whether he knew it on his own personal 
knowledge and he said he did not (R. 169). 
Therefore, point 1 is that it is not established, nor could 
it be, that this survey of the properties ever occurred. As 
further proof of this is the fact that the discrepancies in the 
boundaries between the parcels involved in the consolidated cases 
are not consistent with each other or with the explanation given 
by the respondents' affidavits as to why the error was made. The 
surveyors' affidavits say, for example, that Mr. Rock used the 
witness monument which is east and north of the true monument, 
and that's the reason for the mistake (R. 194). It is true that 
this would explain why the fences are generally north of the true 
boundaries, but the Staker survey, a rough drawing of which is 
attached to the Staker complaint, shows that the Yocom fence is 
west of the true boundary (R. 7), when in fact if Rock had used 
the witness monument as claimed by the affidavits, this line 
would be east. This is conclusive proof that the mistake in 
setting the fences for this residence was not the result of a 
survey using the witness monument instead of the real one. As 
further proof of this is the fact that the distances between the 
fences and the deed lines shown on the diagram on page 5 of this 
brief vary between 75 feet and 88 feet. If Mr. Rock really 
surveyed these properties in 1920 as suggested, one would expect 
the discrepancies to be more uniform. They aren't even uniform 
within each parcel, e.g. the discrepancy on the disputed property 
in this appeal is 80.86 feet on the west and 83.39 feet on the 
east. (C85-5024, R. 3) 
2. Even if there had been such an erroneous survey, it 
could not have been the basis for the setting of the fences in 
the wrong places inasmuch as all of the relevant affidavits 
indicate that the fences and the house were in place long before 
1920 (R. 116-117, 119). The fact that the fences were already 
there prior to 1920 is a further indication of the probability 
that the properties were not surveyed in 1920 as claimed (no need 
to if the fences were already established, even if Rock had 
surveyed other surrounding areas). 
3. In any event, assuming there was such a thing as the 
erroneous Rock survey in 1920, it couldn't possibly qualify under 
t h e
 Halliday opinion as an objective uncertainty. Clearly, 
respondents' arguments have missed the point of footnote 7 to the 
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Halliday opinion, quoted above. It roust be read in light of the 
holding of the court in the main opinion, and it should not be 
overlooked that the word "could" is in italics, i.e., it doesn't 
say an erroneous survey "is" or "does" qualify for boundary by 
acquiescence, only that it could. Regardless of whether it is a 
survey or some other objectively roeasureable circumstance, the 
key word is still "objectivity." That is, an erroneous survey 
could qualify, but to be consistent with the main holding in the 
case, it could qualify only if the error in the survey was based 
on something objective which would necessarily prevent a correct 
survey. 
Suppose a surveyor committed some errors in addition and as 
a result a boundary line was set several feet from its correct 
location. Is that objective? Obviously not. This is because 
objective means that someone else trying to duplicate it would 
necessarily encounter the same problem. How about the witness 
monument theory advanced by respondents? If the surveyor puts 
the boundary in the wrong place because he mistakenly started 
from the wrong place (the witness monument instead of the real 
monument), is that objective? Of course not, itfs subjective the 
same as the addition error, and the next day a survey starting 
from the correct monument would produce a correct survey, that 
is, there is no lack of "reasonably available survey information" 
as required by the three 1984 cases cited above and quoted on 
page 9 of this brief. 
-20-
Obviously, whether it be because of lack of experience or 
because of not being careful at the time, the surveyor's decision 
to use the wrong monument is totally subjective, and therefore 
respondents1 argument fails totally. In fact, the claim of 
respondents' that Mr. Rock started his survey in the wrong place 
is exactly like the facts of the Halliday case. It was pointed 
out in the Halliday opinion (with much less conjecture) that the 
fence line was established by measuring from the wrong side of 
the road. The Court had no difficulty in determining that that 
was not an objective problem and ruling that therefore there was 
no boundary by acquiescence. 
The Shane home. In the lower court respondents have argued 
strenuously that somehow the fact that the true survey boundary 
disects the Shane home is a very important factor in this case. 
That such is not a factor in this appeal is seen from the follow-
ing obvious reasons: 
1. Neither Shane nor Staker nor Holmes/Jensen (being all of 
the parties affected by the boundaries around the house) have 
appealed the decision of the lower court. Therefore, whether the 
judgment of the lower court was right or wrong with respect to 
those boundaries, it hasn't been questioned by those it affects. 
2. Even if the Shane boundary had been appealed and were at 
issue, it would not be relevant to the boundary dispute between 
parcel 1 and parcel 2 about which this appeal concerns. The 
Shane property is several hundred feet and three unrelated 
parcels to the south of the property in dispute in this appeal, 
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and although there may be some similarity in the problems of both 
pieces, it is still a different case. 
3, In any event, the fact that someone built a house over 
the top of a property boundary line in the 1890's doesn't prove 
anything about whether or not there was a dispute or objective 
uncertainty. It may show that the builders thought they were 
building within the boundary, but that is all. It doesn't show 
any dispute or any uncertainty measured by an objective 
standard. They just made a mistake, that's all. As respondents' 
counsel has stated, "We don't have anything before us to tell us 
on what basis that home was set." (R. 254). 
4. In Roman v. Ries, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Calif. 1968), the 
court exercised equitable powers to give the owner of a house 
built on another's land "the portion of land reasonably required 
in order that they will not suffer substantial loss by reliance 
upon the (mistaken) boundary line." The owner of record got the 
rest. This approach would be a much preferable solution to the 
problem of the Shane home being on the boundary line than to the 
disturbing all of the record titles all the way to 9400 South 
Street. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RECORD TITLE IN VIEW OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
As stated above under Point I, appellants do not believe 
there are any issues relating to material facts which would 
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prevent the court from granting summary judgment reinstating the 
record title in appellants (Maxfield, parcel 1) as a matter of 
law. However, there are many such issues to prevent a ruling as 
a matter of law the other way, as was done by the lower court in 
granting summary judgment that boundary by acquiescence had been 
established. 
Numerous issues have been referred to above in connection 
with the discussion of whether or not there really was a Rock 
survey or any other survey, why the fences were placed where they 
were, etc. as they relate to the issue of respondents meeting 
their burden of establishing an objective uncertainty necessary 
to prevail on their claim of boundary by acquiescence* 
Additional issues exist with respect to parcel 1 and parcel 
2 which may not exist with respect to the other properties in the 
consolidated cases, and these are related to the precise location 
of the alleged boundary and whether there ever could have been a 
boundary up to a line certain in view of the constantly changing 
fence line because of the changing watercourse (R. 184). See 
dissent in Parsons v^ Anderson, supra at 540. As mentioned 
above, appellants have alleged that the fence was built to 
protect livestock from the dangerous and steep watercourse. 
Appellants would seek an opportunity to present evidence of such 
to a trier of fact in a trial of the matter and believe that the 
lay of the land, i.e., the steepness and danger presented as 
described in Maxfield's affidavit, along with the history of the 
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last decade and half known to Maxfield and his observation of the 
condition existing then indicating that the fence has been moved 
to protect cattle as the erosion has moved north, would show 
substantial issues respecting this point. The Maxfield affidavit 
definitely establishes that the present fence line is not in the 
location as shown in the metes and bounds call based on the 
recent survey of Ainsworth as cited in Ainsworth's complaint, 
e.g. the 15 or 20 foot jog is not consistent with the calls 
therein (R. 167-170, 184, and C85-5024 R. 2-4). 
CONCLUSION 
The fence lines involved in this case were probably estab-
lished as long ago as the 1890's. Whether it be the result of 
the influence of this lengthy period of time or some other 
reason, it appears that the respondents and the lower court have 
overlooked, ignored or misunderstood the Utah Supreme Court's 
holdings in the three 1984 cases cited above. While it is true 
that it requires only 20 years of acquiescence to create a 
boundary, it wouldn't matter if a fence were in place for five 
times that (as is almost true in the present case), or even a 
hundred times that, the extra number of years simply cannot take 
the place of any of the required elements (in this case tne 
objective uncertainty element). In Halliday v. Cluff, supra, the 
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fence went back to 1930, also a very long time (more than 50 
years), and that didn't deter the Court from ruling in favor of 
the record title. One can multiply the 20 year prerequisite 
period many times, but if the objective uncertainty element is 
missing then there isn't even one year of acquiescence to support 
the change of a boundary away from the record title. That is the 
case here - respondents (Ainsworth) are unable to show acquies-
cence for even one year, and therefore the summary judgment 
should be reversed as a matter of law and title restored to the 
record owner (Maxfield). 
DATED this 20th day of August, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David H. Day 
Jay V. Barney 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Conrad G. Maxfiefld and 
Utah National Corporation 
u* 
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.LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
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By Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STUART 
NOAL D. 
and 
NOAL D. 
CONRAD 
STAKER, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
AINSWORTH, et al., : 
Defendants, : 
AINSWORTH, et al., : 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
G. MAXFIELD, et al. : 
Defendants. : 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No- C85-2883 
(Judge Wilkinson) 
The motions of plaintiff Stuart Staker, defendants 
Holmes and Jensen, Ainsworth, and plaintiff Conrad Maxfield, 
having come on for hearing on the 2nd day of February, 1987, at 
the hour of 9:00 a^m. and plaintiff Staker being represented by 
his counsel Joseph C. Rust, defendants Holmes and Jensen being 
represented by their counsel, Gerald Jensen, defendants Ainsworth 
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being represented by their counsel, Mitchell Olsen, defendant 
Shane appearing in person and plaintiff Conrad Maxfield being 
represented by Conrad Maxfield, David Day, and Jay Barney, 
defendants Yocum neither being present nor represented by 
counsel, and, the court having theretofore received certain 
affidavits from the various parties and the court having reviewed 
the same as well as memoranda submitted by counsel, and the court 
having heard the arguments of counsel, and the court having 
further given counsel an opportunity to submit any additional 
affidavits which they considered necessary for a consideration of 
the motions for summary judgment, and counsel having indicated in 
open court that, with the exception of affidavits of surveyors to 
clarify previously submitted affidavits, no further affidavits 
were necessary in order for the court to rule on the various 
motions for summary judgment, and the court having later received 
such affidavits from counsel for Ainsworth and counsel for Conrad 
Maxfield, and the court having reviewed the same, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Staker, defendants Ainsworth and 
defendants Holmes and Jensen's motions for summary judgment are 
granted and the fence lines separating the respective properties 
at issue in this case are determined by this court to be the true 
and proper boundary lines between the respective parties. 
2. The motion for summary judgment by plaintiff 
Maxfield is denied. 
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DATED this %3 day of March, 1987 
BY THE COURT: ATTfcST 
H.SX0NH»NDUEY_ 
oAorable Corner S. Wilkinson 
_ District Court Judge 
Deputy Clerk [ <£ SrJ~~ X ttt 
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David H. Day, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Conrad Maxfield 
Conrad Maxfield 
3609 East Escalde Avenue 
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